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The Convention on the Law of the
Sea: A Preliminary Appraisal
ARVID PARDO*
The author of the Maltese Resolution conducts an in-depth
analysis of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
which was recently signed by 119 nations on December 10, 1982.
He concludes that in certain areas, the Convention does not re-
flect true compromise but rather vague drafting which masks con-
tinued disparate positions among the signing States.
The most ambitious example of global negotiations under
United Nations auspices came to an end on April 30, 1982 when
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UN-
CLOS IM) concluded its substantive work by adopting the text of
a Convention' by a vote of 130 to 4 with 17 abstentions. 2 The Con-
vention, with its nearly 200 pages, 320 articles in 17 parts, and 9
annexes, is certainly one of the most-if not the most-exhaustive
and complex documents ever drafted by an international confer-
ence. It is intended to constitute a comprehensive legal frame-
work for man's activities in the marine environment and it reflects
* Professor of Political Science and Senior Research Fellow, Institute for
Marine and Coastal Studies, University of Southern California; former Permanent
Representative of Malta to the United Nations, and former Ambassador from
Malta to the United States.
1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/
122 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Convention].
2. U.N. Dep't of Pub. Information, Press Release SEA/494, at 1 (Apr. 30, 1982).
The four States rejecting the treaty were Israel, Turkey, United States and Vene-
zuela. Those abstaining included. Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Czechoslova-
Ida, German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, Italy,
Luxembourg, Mongolia, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Thailand, Ukraine, USSR and
United Kingdom. Id. Nearly all these States are members of NATO or of the War-
saw Pact.
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the contrasting trends-innovative and conservative, nationalist
and internationalist-in the world and at the conference.
There can be no doubt that the preparation and near unani-
mous approval of the Convention on the Law of the Sea is in itself
a major achievement. For the first time in history, a heterogene-
ous and bitterly divided international community has attempted
to establish an all-inclusive conventional framework for man's ac-
tivities in the marine environment, instead of leaving the develop-
ment of law to the practice of States and to the traditional process
of claim and counterclaim supplemented by treaties dealing with
a limited subject matter.
The Convention reflects the contemporary need for resource
management and regulation of activities in wide areas of the
marine environment, which is the inevitable consequence of tech-
nological advance and of our intensified and ever more diversified
uses of ocean space. Hence, adoption of the Convention marks a
radical change in the structure of traditional law of the sea. Im-
portant innovations are almost too numerous to list. They in-
clude, among others:
1. Substantial change in the concept of innocent passage;3
2. Introduction of the concept of transit passage of straits used
for international navigation;4
3. The concept of archipelagic water;5
4. The concept of the exclusive economic zone;6
5. Fundamental change in the definition of the legal continental
shelf;7
6. Recognition of the right to conduct scientific research and to
construct artificial islands as additional freedoms of the high
seas together with a number of significant developments of
traditional law relating to the high seas;8
7. The concept of a general environmental law of the sea based
on the obligation of all States to protect and preserve the
marine environment and to control all sources of marine
pollution;9
8. Provisions establishing a comprehensive regime for marine
scientific research and creating the obligation to cooperate in
the development and transfer of marine science and
3. Convention, supra note 1, art. 19.
4. Id. arts. 37-44.
5. Id. art. 49; see Richardson, Law of the Sea: Navigation and other Tradi-
tional National Security Considerations, 19 SAN DIEGO L. Rzv. 553, 566-68 (1982).
6. See Convention, supra note 1, arts. 55-75.
7. Id. art. 76.
8. Id. art. 87, para. 1.
9. Id. arts. 192, 207, 237.
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technology.' 0
These and other provisions both technical and substantive, in
themselves sufficient to transform traditional law of the sea, are
complemented by two far-reaching innovations which, if effec-
tively implemented, could mark a revolution not merely in the
law of the sea but also in international law. These are (a) the dis-
pute settlement system," which is the most flexible, comprehen-
sive and binding system of dispute settlement contained in any
general international convention, and (b) international recogni-
tion that the seabed and its resources beyond national jurisdic-
tion are the common heritage of mankind, with implementation of
this principle through the establishment of an international insti-
tution-the International Sea-Bed Authority' 2-- specifically cre-
ated to regulate and manage the mineral resources of the deep
seabed for the benefit of all mankind. This could be a precedent
of incalculable importance for the future.
Inevitably, an extremely complex Convention dealing with
many highly controversial political matters cannot be expected to
be without shortcomings. Many provisions could be considered
superfluous or undesirable, but they should not bring us to ques-
tion the remarkable work of UNCLOS EIE, unless we have reason
to believe that the Convention is flawed in some fundamental
way.
The Convention may be evaluated from a variety of sectoral
points of view; analysis based on a perceived national interest
could lead to different conclusions depending on the nation con-
cerned. It is accordingly necessary to seek to appraise the Con-
vention from a non-national, non-sectoral point of view. The first
question which arises in this context is whether the Convention
serves the functions which a comprehensive law of the sea treaty
should serve. According to former Ambassador Stevenson, these
functions include: 1) accommodation of interests; 2) prevention
of conflict; 3) predictability or ability to foresee what activities can
be undertaken with reasonable assurance that other States will
acquiesce; and, finally, 4) promotion of common or community
objectives.13
10. Id. arts. 238-278.
11. Id. arts. 186-191.
12. Id. art 156.
13. Address by John R. Stevenson before the Philadelphia World Affairs
With respect to the first point, there can be no doubt that the
Convention evidences throughout the mark of accommodation of
interests, for without such accommodation, it would have been
impossible to compose a text which will undoubtedly be signed
by, the great majority of States. The real question, however, is
whether the accommodation of interests and political com-
promises of the Convention reflect substantive accommodation of
interests between the States concerned or whether these appar-
ent compromises are, in fact, only carefully drafted formulations
designed to mask continued fundamental disagreement on basic
issues. In the latter case, of course, no substantive accommoda-
tion of interests has occurred and conflict is not avoided, but
merely postponed.
Each issue must be examined individually for the evidence of
this accommodation; generalization is impossible. In some cases,
as for instance with respect to the limits of the territorial sea, the
provisions of the Convention undoubtedly reflect substantive
agreement on the part of the overwhelming majority of the inter-
national community. In other far more numerous cases, however,
there are strong grounds for believing that representatives at the
Conference, having ascertained the impossibility of reaching
agreement on the substance of an issue, mainly searched thereaf-
ter for formulae sufficiently vague or ambiguous to permit all the
significant States concerned to claim that their policy objectives
have been accommodated in a more or less acceptable way. For
instance, article 76 enables States that argued for a clearly de-
fined maximum limit to the so-called continental shelf to claim
that the international community has adopted such a limit---"350
nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured or... 100 nautical miles from the 2500
metre isobath."14 At the same time, mid-ocean archipelagic
States and States with long coastlines fronting on the open
oceans, that strongly supported a very flexible definition of the
area which they euphemistically describe as the continental shelf,
feel quite satisfied. They are well aware that straight baselines
can be established at the discretion of the coastal State within the
broad guidelines of article 7 of the Convention and that the word-
ing of article 76 is such as to provide the coastal State with ample
arguments to support very expansive claims.1 -
Council and the Philadelphia Bar Association, 64 Am. J. INT'L L 634, 634-35 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Address by John R. Stevenson].
14. Convention, supra note 1, art. 76, paras. 5, 6.
15. Id. Annex II. Establishment of the proposed Commission on the limits of
the continental shelf (Annex 11) is unlikely to significantly hamper most coastal
States with appropriate geographical characteristics from claiming very wide legal
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Article 74 on the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone
between States with opposite or adjacent coasts is another of
many examples of a formula designed to satisfy the requirements
of States with diametrically opposed views. 16 A further interest-
ing example of purely formal accommodation of diametrically op-
posed viewpoints is the phrase "exclusively for peaceful
purposes" which recurs with a certain frequency in the Conven-
tion.17 The meaning of the phrase is not defined and there may
be some question as to whether it has a definable meaning.1 8 The
phrase, however, is useful in that it accommodates those States
that would wish to see most military uses of ocean space strictly
limited and at the same time it does not seriously inconvenience
States that believe extensive military use of ocean space is a re-
grettable necessity.
Prevention of conflict and predictability-that is, the ability to
foresee what activities can be undertaken with reasonable assur-
ance that other States will acquiesce-are two other identified
functions of a comprehensive law of the sea. Here again it is im-
possible to generalize. It is certainly true that the rights of
coastal States are described in considerable detail in the Conven-
tion and to this extent predictability is enhanced. On the other
hand, it would be difficult to assert that in other matters the Con-
vention consistently furthers the objectives of conflict prevention
and predictability. Many of the most important definitions-such
as those concerning the legal continental shelf,19 the meaning of
continental shelves since the functions of the Commission are limited to providing
scientific and technical advice, and to making recommendations on the outer lim-
its of the continental shelf in areas where those limits extend beyond 200 nautical
miles from the appropriate baselines.
16. For a criticism of this formula, see Oxman, The Third United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea: The Tenth Session (1981), 76 Am. J. hir'L L. 1, 14-15
(1982).
17. For instance, marine scientific research must be conducted exclusively for
peaceful purposes; the international seabed area must be used exclusively for
peaceful purposes, etc. See Convention, supra note 1, arts. 88, 141, 301.
18. The words "exclusively for peaceful purposes" convey the vague, mislead-
ing, but useful, impression that the Convention will somehow reverse the ongoing
process of intensive militarization of ocean space.
19. Convention, supra note 1, art. 76. The definition, which replaces that con-
tained in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, states that the
continental shelf of a coastal State extends "throughout the natural prolongation
of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of
200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea
is measured .... " Id. art 76, para. 1. The outer edge of the continental margin,
493
innocent passage20 and of straits used for international naviga-
tion 2L--are unacceptably vague. In other cases, the drafters of the
Convention have preferred to avoid all mention of a problem con-
sidered to be delicate or excessively controversial. Thus, for in-
stance, the Convention does not mention any of the problems
which are known to exist with regard to the polar regions.22 Si-
lence of the Convention with regard to these problems may be
understandable since many of them do not necessarily require
immediate determination. Less understandable, however, is the
total silence of the Convention on all military uses of the marine
environment. It is known that the legality of many of these uses
is controverted 23 and it is also clear that in the present tense in-
when more than 200 nautical miles from the baselines, is determined either by a
line based on the thickness of sedimentary rocks or by a line delineated "by refer-
ence to fixed points not more than 60 nautical miles from the foot of the continen-
tal slope." Id. art. 76, para. 4(ii). In any case, the outer limits of the continental
slope "either shall not exceed 350 nautical miles from the baselines ... or ... 100
nautical miles from the 2500 metre isobath. . . ." On submarine ridges, "the outer
limit of the continental shelf shall not exceed 350 nautical miles from the baselines
.... " Id. art. 76, para. 6. But this provision "does not apply to submarine eleva-
tions that are natural components of the continental margin, such as its plateaus,
rises, caps, banks and spurs." Id.
20. Id. art. 19. Under this article, passage of a foreign vessel in the territorial
sea is considered prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal
State if it engages in a dozen or so enumerated activities, including "any other ac-
tivity not having a direct bearing on passage." Id. para. 2(l). But the article does
not state that a ship complying in every way with the provisions of article 19 en-
joys the right of innocent passage. In other words, a coastal State still enjoys the
discretionary power to decide whether passage of a foreign vessel in a particular
case is or is not prejudicial to its peace, good order or security.
21. Id. arts. 34-36. The major maritime powers have repeatedly stressed the
importance of unhampered passage through straits used for international naviga-
tion, yet the Convention contains no useful definition of such straits. See Address
by John &. Stevenson, supra note 13, at 636-39. It is therefore difficult to ascertain
whether the new principle of transit passage is applicable to straits which are in-
frequently transited by foreign vessels. Bearing in mind that controversies can
arise even in such heavily traveled straits as those of Malacca, it would have been
useful to include in an annex to the Convention a list of straits recognized as used
for international navigation. It would have also been useful to prescribe compul-
sory and binding settlement of any dispute on whether a particular strait is or is
not a strait used for international navigation.
22. In the Arctic, the legal status of the so-called sector principle remains un-
determined. According to this theory, nations facing the Arctic "may project their
territorial sovereignty into this region in terms of geographical determined sec-
tors." 0. SAVARLiEN, TuE EASTERN GREENLAND CASE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
60-61 (U. Fla. Monographs-Soc. Sci.-No. 21, Winter 1964), cited in Note, Delimit-
ing Continental Shelf Boundaries in the Arctic: The United States-Canada
Beaufort Sea Boundary, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 221, 229 (1982). There are many legal
questions relating to the seas surrounding Antarctica. None have been addressed
at the Conference on the Law of the Sea.
23. The legality of the following, among many other, military uses of the
marine environment remains undeterminech (a) transit of foreign warships in the
territorial sea without notification to, or the consent of, the coastal State;
(b) reservation of vast areas of the high seas for significant periods of time for
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ternational climate certain legally doubtful military uses of the
marine environment could give rise to dangerous incidents.
The last of the objectives mentioned by Ambassador Stevenson
as proper for a comprehensive Law of the Sea Convention is the
promotion of community objectives such as "the need to assure
that the environment of this planet remains hospitable to human
life."24 There can be no doubt that Committee MI has done re-
markable work in Part XII of the Convention in developing inter-
national law on the protection and preservation of the marine
environment. But even here there are serious deficiencies. The
major concern in Part XII is the control of vessel source pollu-
tion25 and this has caused some imbalance in the text since vessel
source pollution, while certainly important, is seldom as injurious
to the marine environment as other sources of pollution which
have received far less detailed treatment in the Convention.
Another omission in Part XII is quite deplorable. The present
Convention totally ignores the question of nuclear waste disposal
in the marine environment, the importance of which has been rec-
ognized for at least twenty-five years.26 The present Convention
missile testing or other security purposes; and (c) emplacement of anti-submarine
warfare devices on the continental shelf of another State, Without the latter's con-
sent. Most powers usually go to considerable lengths to avoid confrontations in
the marine environment; yet confrontations will be increasingly difficult to avoid
precisely because the rights and duties of States with regard to the military uses
of the seas are so controverted. The Convention contains recommendations and
exhortations on a number of subjects of varying importance, it would have been
useful had the Convention had something to say on this very important subject.
24. Address by John R. Stevenson, supra note 13, at 635.
25. Convention, supra note 1, art. 211. In this connection the Convention is
important not so much because of its concern with vessel source pollution-a sub-
ject which has been the object of international negotiations and agreements for at
least thirty years-but rather because it recognizes the competence of coastal
(and port) States to deal with vessels suspected of causing such pollution outside
the territorial sea. The newly recognized competence of coastal (and port) States
not only limits the previously exclusive competence of the flag State but could
perhaps in the future be used to exercise indirect control over foreign vessels
transiting in the exclusive economic zone. The danger was recognized at the Con-
ference and the text contains several balancing provisions designed to protect
freedom of navigation. We must hope that these provisions and the vigilance of
the maritime powers will effectively contain the aspirations of some coastal States
to exercise a measure of control over foreign vessels in all marine areas under
some form of coastal State jurisdiction.
26. See Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 25, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 2319,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 96. The International Atomic Energy Agency has
been conducting studies on nuclear waste disposal for at least twenty years but
these have not led to much effective action. Some regional conventions prohibit
refers in general to the "release of toxic, harmful or noxious sub-
stances, especially those which are persistent... by dumping."27
Radioactive wastes may be one of the toxic, harmful or noxious
substances referred to in the Convention; nevertheless, it is un-
fortunate that they are not specifically mentioned, as was done in
the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, 28 since the expanding use
of nuclear power for the purpose of energy generation is rapidly
increasing the quantities of radioactive wastes being produced.
The Convention, without taking a position on whether or not radi-
oactive wastes should be disposed of in the marine environment,
could usefully have suggested the observance of special precau-
tionary measures similar to those in article 23 of the Convention
in the event of such disposal.29
We may thus not unfairly conclude that the present Conven-
tion, to some extent at least, does not serve the function which a
comprehensive law of the sea treaty should serve. The Conven-
tion, however, should not be evaluated in isolation; even a docu-
ment of limited value in itself could be extremely valuable if it
strengthens world order or cooperation within the United Nations
system or if it furthers equity between States or solutions to
global problems relating to resource management and utilization.
Does the Convention do this?
I shall confine my comments to two questions. First, does the
present Convention strengthen world order by furthering equity
between States in ocean space? Second, do the provisions of the
Convention promote rational solutions of global management and
utilization problems by establishing legal regimes appropriate to
this purpose in marine areas both within and outside national
jurisdiction?
With regard to the first question, there can be no doubt that the
Convention reflects primarily the highly acquisitive aspirations of
many coastal States, particularly of those developed and develop-
ing States with long coastlines fronting on the open ocean and of
mid-ocean archipelagic States. Perhaps as much as forty percent
the disposal of high-level wastes in the marine environment; however, little has
been done at the international level to restrict disposal of low-level wastes in the
seas.
27. Convention, .upra note 1, art. 194, para. 3(a).
28. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 26, art. 25.
29. Article 23 of the Convention states that "ships carrying nuclear or other in-
herently dangerous or noxious substances shall... carry documents and observe
special precautionary measures .... " Convention, supra note 1, art. 23. In the
case of nuclear waste disposal in the marine environment, siting and packaging
precautions are particularly important
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of ocean space,30 by far the most valuable in terms of economic
uses and accessible resources, is placed under some form of na-
tional control. This means that all exploitable offshore hydrocar-
bons; all commercial exploitable minerals in unconsolidated
sediments-from sand and gravel to tin, most phosphorite nod-
ules, a significant proportion of the recently discovered polymetal-
lic sulphide deposits and cobalt crusts, and several manganese
nodule deposits; over ninety percent of commercially exploited
living resources of the sea;3 1 nearly all marine plants; and all
known sites suitable to the production of energy from the sea are
recognized as the exclusive property of coastal States. The value
of these resources must be estimated at many trillions of dollars.
The magnitude of this appropriation, in terms both of area and of
resources, is unprecedented in history.
Nor is this all. Since the limits of national jurisdiction are not
clearly defined in the Convention, coastal States fronting on the
open ocean can continue, within broad limits, to extend their con-
trol in the marine environment as their marine capabilities in-
crease and their national interests appear to dictate. Despite
some attempt at compensation,32 it is clear that this basic aspect
of the Convention is grossly inequitable not only as between
coastal States and landlocked and geographically disadvantaged
States, but also as between coastal States themselves: only ten of
these in fact obtain more than half the marine area which the
Convention places under national control.33
On the other hand, it would appear at first sight that the Con-
30. It is recalled that: (a) vast areas of the marine environment may now be
enclosed by archipelagic baselines; (b) the Convention sets no limit to the length
of straight baselines, apart from archipelagic baselines; (c) the continental shelf
may now extend in some cases up to (and even beyond) 350 miles from the appro-
priate baselines; and (d) the definition of islands in the Convention permits rocks
(and probably sandbanks) which can "sustain human habitation" to claim a legal
continental shelf and an exclusive economic zone.
31. Gulland, FAO Fisheries Tech. Paper 206 at 1, U.N. FAO Doc. FIRM/T206
(1980).
32. See Convention, supra note 1, arts. 69, 70, 82.
33. See, e.g., Villanova Colloquium on Peace, Justice and the Law of the Sea,
Paper No. 3 (1977). It should be noted that adequate scientific capability, appro-
priate technology and substantial financial resources are required to effectively
develop offshore resources, particularly mineral resources; thus, only wealthy
countries and a few large developing countries such as China, Brazil, India and a
few others have the means themselves to engage in significant offshore develop-
ment. This could mean that marine areas under the jurisdiction of many small de-
veloping countries, such as the mid-ocean archipelagic States in the Pacific Ocean,
vention seriously addresses the difficult problems of marine re-
source management. Thus the Convention obligates States to
"promote and facilitate the development and conduct of marine
scientific research" 34 which is the indispensable prerequisite to
rational resource management.35 States are enjoined to cooperate
with each other and with "competent" international organizations
to this end. 36 Additionally, elaborate provision is made for inter-
national management of the mineral resources of the seabed be-
yond national jurisdiction.37
Nevertheless, the approach of the Convention to problems of
marine resource management appears seriously deficient in many
respects. A fundamental deficiency is the unstated assumption
that all coastal States are both willing and capable to effectively
administer living marine resources within their jurisdiction, an
assumption which patently does not correspond to reality. Even
if all coastal States did have this capability, however, rational liv-
ing resource management would be impossible in the small
marine areas allocated to the majority of coastal States. Hence,
most of the injunctions contained in article 61 of the Convention
are likely to remain a dead letter in many parts of the world.3 8 At
the same time, despite the provisions of article 23939 and others,
marine scientific research related to natural resources in marine
areas under coastal State jurisdiction is subjected to a discretion-
ary consent regime, which in many cases is likely to prove bur-
densome. Thus the Convention cannot be said to encourage in
could be exploited in practice predominantly for the benefit of technologically ad-
vanced countries with far-reaching political consequences.
34. Convention, supra note 1, art. 239. The Convention contains a number of
additional articles stressing the importance of scientific research.
35. Within the exclusive economic zone "[tihe coastal State, taking into ac-
count the best scientific evidence available to it, shall ensure through proper con-
servation and management measures that the maintenance of the living resources
... is not endangered by over-exploitation." Id. art. 61, para. 2.
36. Id. Beyond national jurisdiction, "all States have the duty to take, or to
cooperate with other States in taking, such measures for their respective nationals
as may be necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas,"
id. art. 117, an obligation identical to the one already affirmed in the 1958 Geneva
Convention on Fisheries. Sqe Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living
Resources of the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 1(2), 17 U.S.T. 138, 140, T.LA.S. No.
5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285, 288. In addition, the Convention obligates States to adopt
conservation measures with respect to the living resources of the high seas. See
Convention, supra note 1, art. 119.
37. See Convention, supra note 1, arts. 133-191, Annex III.
38. See id. art. 61. It should also be noted that under the Convention the
coastal State assumes no resource management obligations, even in theory, with
respect to resources in archipelagic waters, the legal continental shelf, and the ter-
ritorial sea.
39. Id. art. 239.
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practice either marine scientific research or rational management
of marine resources.
While the provisions of the Convention would appear, in theory,
to somewhat improve living resource management and conserva-
tion in the high seas,40 the common heritage regime established
for the international seabed area is little short of a disaster. The
future international Authority4' plays no role whatsoever in the
determination of the limits of the international seabed;42 the com-
petence of the Authority is limited strictly to the exploration and
exploitation of mineral resources; 43 the decision-making proce-
dures of the Council of the Authority-ranging, according to the
nature of the question, from a two-thirds majority to a consen-
sus4 4-- are such as to render unlikely appropriate and timely deci-
sions on important questions.
Finally, the fact that the Authority is based on the erroneous
assumption that it would have a virtual monopoly of exploitable
manganese nodule deposits has had highly unfortunate conse-
40. See, e.g., id. arts. 118, 119, which enjoin cooperation and exchange of infor-
mation between States and the adoption by them of measures designed, among
other things, "to maintain or restore populations of harvested species at levels
which can produce the maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant envi-
ronmental and economic factors ... ." Id. art. 119, para. 1(a). The Convention,
however, is studded with similar general injunctions on a variety of subjects. It
remains to be seen whether the rhetoric of the Convention will be effective in re-
versing contemporary trends, which, in some instances, seem to suggest the likeli-
hood of less, rather than more, intergovernmental cooperation in the conservation
and management of the living resources of the sea, as pressures on these re-
sources increase.
41. Convention, supra note 1, arts. 156, 157.
42. Id. art. 134. Article 134 is cryptic, but it seems that the future Authority
(a) must passively await notification by coastal States of the limits of their conti-
nental shelves; (b) may not question in any way the limits notified to it; (c) may
not remind any coastal State of its obligation to establish firm limits to its conti-
nental shelf. and (d) may not establish provisional boundaries for the Interna-
tional Seabed Area in the event that coastal State notifications are delayed.
43. Id. art. 1, para. 3. Questions relating to the transfer of technology or to the
protection of human life in the marine environment concern the future Authority
only insofar as they are directly related to seabed mineral resource exploration
and exploitation. The Authority has no competence with respect to the living re-
sources of the International Seabed Area.
It should be noted that although the Convention refers in general to exploration
and exploitation of mineral resources, its provisions focus in practice only on man-
ganese nodule exploration and exploitation. This is due to the erroneous assump-
tion that manganese nodules are the only minerals of economic interest for the
foreseeable future in the International Seabed Area.
44. Id. art. 161.
quences. Thus it was considered unnecessary to pay much atten-
tion to the efficiency of mineral resource exploitation in the
international seabed area. Only this, and perhaps hopes of more
or less permanent subsidies by developed countries, can explain
general acceptance of the enormously inefficient "parallel sys-
tem"45 and the unimaginative way in which the structure of the
future Authority and the related Enterprise have been con-
ceived.46 As a result it will be difficult for the Enterprise to har-
vest manganese nodules at competitive prices without continuing
subsidies and for the foreseeable future there will be no financial
benefits from the operations of the Authority to be shared by de-
veloping countries. At the same time, the belief that the Author-
ity would have a monopoly of exploitable manganese nodule
deposits largely explains the complex production limitation provi-
sions introduced in Part XI of the Convention. These limitations
were to protect developing countries from adverse effects on their
economies or on their export earnings resulting from reductions
in the prices of minerals contained in manganese nodules caused
by exploitation in the international seabed area. Since manga-
nese nodule deposits are known to exist within national jurisdic-
tion because of the expansive provisions on jurisdictional limits
contained in other parts of the Convention, the only effect of pro-
duction limitations in the international area alone is to further
complicate manganese nodule mining beyond national jurisdic-
tion and to further undermine the viability of the Authority.47
45. In my view, the parallel system is a disastrous political compromise. It
was totally unnecessary for developing countries to insist on the creation of a mo-
nopolistic and bureaucratic Enterprise in order to maintain international control
of operations in the seabed beyond national jurisdiction. It was equally unneces-
sary for developed countries to insist on a licensing system. In any case, the obvi-
ous compromise should have been a system of joint ventures on an equal basis
between the Authority and entities wishing to engage in manganese nodule min-
ing. The specific conditions of each joint venture could have been negotiated on
an ad hoc basis within general treaty guidelines. A flexible joint venture system
would have avoided most of the complexities, costs and inefficiencies which are
embodied in the Convention.
46. The Authority and the related Enterprise are established on the model of
certain large specialized agencies, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations (FAO), despite their different functions. Among other
things, provision is made for heavy bureaucratic superstructures-the initial an-
nual costs of which are estimated to range from $145 to $280 million, to which
should be added $350 to $700 million in loans required to permit the future Enter-
prise to begin operations. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L.65 (1982).
47. It is obvious, other things being equal, that there will be an incentive to
exploit manganese nodules within national jurisdiction if production controls are
enforced only in the International Seabed Area. Negotiation of global commodity
arrangements would probably be the most practical way to attempt to protect de-
veloping countries' producers of the minerals contained in the nodules. It should
be realized, however, that present land producers cannot realistically expect indef-
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Thus, there arises the unpleasant prospect of the establishment
of new and expensive international organizations incapable of ef-
fectively performing the functions for which they were created.
However, implementation of much of Part XI of the Convention
and related annexes has been indefinitely postponed by the adop-
tion of resolutions I and H at the spring 1982 session of the Con-
ference.48  These resolutions confer upon the Preparatory
Commission of the Authority some powers that it might not
otherwise have received. Thus it may be possible for the Com-
mission to draft rules and regulations which adjust some of the
provisions of the Convention to realities; whether this can be
done under a strict interpretation of the terms of the resolutions
concerned is, however, uncertain.
CONCLUSION
Although the present Convention reproduces, almost without
change, most of the definitions and technical rules contained in
the 1958 Geneva Conventions and adds a few more, it is-to a far
greater extent than these Conventions-a political document. As
such, the present Convention is truly a '"package deal" containing
innumerable bilateral and multilateral political compromises.
Many of the legal rules established are sometimes based on noth-
ing more substantial than political deals designed to accommo-
date the parochial interests of individual States.49 As a political
document, the present Convention reflects-although to a differ-
ent extent and in different ways-both the predominant interests
of politically ascendant States and the general aspirations of the
contemporary world community.
Politically ascendant States are no longer merely the traditional
maritime powers or the so-called super-powers, but comprise also
States, both developed and developing, with long coastlines front-
ing on the open oceans. These are the States which are now, or
initely to avoid all adverse effects on their economies or export earnings caused by
the recent *discoveries of seabed minerals-manganese nodules, polymetallic
sulphides, cobalt crusts, etc.-whether within or outside national jurisdiction.
48. Resolution I established a Preparatory Commission for the International
Sea-Bed Authority and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. Draft
Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Annex I,
res. 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/121 (1982). Resolution H governs pioneer mining ac-
tivities. Id. res. 2.
49. See, e.g., Convention, supra note 1, art. 7, para. 2; art. 47, paras. 2, 8.
have the potential of becoming, global powers. Traditional mari-
time powers no longer view navigation as their overwhelmingly
predominant interest in the marine environment, but only as an
important interest largely balanced by the increasing value of
ocean space for resource exploitation purposes. States with long
coastlines fronting on the open ocean-some of which, such as the
United States, are also traditional maritime powers-necessarily
have increasing navigational interests in addition to their interest
in the exploitation of the resources of the sea. In this context, the
Convention is essentially concerned first, in the allocation to
coastal States of the largest possible areas of ocean space; second,
in making sure that coastal State control over resources and other
uses of the sea, except navigation and communications, is essen-
tially discretionary in ar~as claimed to be under national jurisdic-
tion 50 and, third, that freedom of navigation, overflight and the
laying of submarine cables and pipelines within national jurisdic-
tion is maintained to the greatest possible extent.5 1 Thus, from
this point of view, the importance of the Convention resides prin-
cipally in the official recognition by the majority of the interna-
tional community of the results of the ongoing enclosure
movement in ocean space.
It would not be right, however, to view the Convention as re-
flecting only the perceived national interests of a relatively small
group of States. Much of the rhetoric of the Convention, several
general provisions and some whole sections, such as the dispute
settlement provisions and Part XI on the international seabed
area, reflect-imperfectly or vaguely-general aspirations for a
new order in the seas, based on international cooperation in
meeting the needs of mankind as a whole rather than on interna-
tional competition in the satisfaction of national interests. It is a
pity that this side of the Convention has not been developed in a
practical way. Instead a truly historic opportunity to mold the le-
gal framework governing human activities in the marine environ-
ment in such a way as to contribute effectively to the realization
50. It is probably a mistake to take too seriously the concern for management
of living resources expressed in article 61 or the rhetoric of international coopera-
tion expressed in many parts of the text. More reflective of realities are provi-
sions, such as article 63, paragraph 2, which make abundantly clear that the
principle of cooperative management of resources is applicable only in marine ar-
eas beyond national jurisdiction.
51. However, maritime powers and those States with long coastlines which are
not maritime powers disagree on military uses of the sea, hence silence on these
questions.
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of a just and equitable international order in the seas, responsive
to the vital need for harmonization of marine uses and manage-
ment of marine resources for the benefit of all, has been lost.

